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Abstract
In a spatial model of both horizontal and vertical differentiation where an agent
can occupy an interval rather than a point on the Hotelling line, one can examine
the trade-off between depth (a narrow high quality position) and breadth (a wide low
quality range). In particular, the extent of depth or breadth can be non-monotonic in
the strength of competition.
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In numerous skilled fields, agents face a trade-off between acquiring broad or specialized
skills. Lawyers, consultants, and academics invest in both general widely applicable skills
and knowledge, as well as more particular skills and knowledge on subfields, industries, and
tasks. Before beginning to practice, for example, a lawyer could choose a broad education
in family law, a greater degree concentration in a particular aspect such as divorce law, or
instead focus on corporate law in general, or again a particular aspect, such as corporate
tax. An agent’s decision on how to make such investments depends on her expectations of
the returns for such investment. Demand and the nature and extent of competition from
rivals determine the returns to investment in broad and deep skills.
Specialization has been a central concern in economics dating back at least to the
opening of Smith (1776). However, the literature has focused on technological and scale
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effects for specialization. Essentially, focussing on how efficiency considerations determine
the extent of specialization and highlighting the role of technology. Here, in addition, I
highlight that strategic/competitive effects can play an important role.
This note presents a preliminary analysis of these strategic effects in a spatial model of
both vertical and horizontal differentiation. Depth is captured by vertical quality. Breadth
is captured by allowing an agent to position herself on an interval rather than a point
on the Hotelling line, reflecting that an agent might possess a broad range of expertise.
The model thus allows a simple approach to expressing a trade-off between breadth and
depth. I show that strategic concerns lead to outcomes that need not correspond to the
efficient benchmark. Further. the focus and central result of this paper is that the extent
of specialization might be non-monotonic in the extent of competition.
Though numerous extensions can be envisaged and are briefly discussed in the con-
clusions, in this note I analyse duopoly on a Hotelling line with agents at either end and
constrained to choose either a broad or deep strategy, before competing in price. The
extent of competition or differentiation is captured by varying the transport costs on the
line. A number of effects arise and allow the extent of specialization in the market to vary
non-monotonically in the transport cost. Specifically, at very low transport costs, agents
soften price competition by competing on the vertical dimension and so one agent is deep
and the other broad. As transport costs increase, the agents compete horizontally by both
choosing to specialize. As transport costs increase further, another affect dominates: the
agents can charge higher prices by getting closer to customers and saving them travel costs;
this entails a broad strategy, and so both agents choose breadth.
As far as I am aware, this is among the first analyses of breadth and depth for an
agent and strategic effects in a spatial model.2,3 However, the separate effects described
are familiar from a couple of papers to which this note owes much. Neven and Thisse (1990)
argue that competition shifts from the vertical to the horizontal dimension as transport
costs increase. Alexandrov (2006) analyses firms choosing intervals on the Hotelling line in
a model of purely horizontal competition and shows how the effect that firms seek to get
2There is a literature that considers multi-product firms competing both vertically and horizontally,
reviewed in Section 5 of Mañez and Waterson (2001). However, the focus with respect to multiple product
offerings is with regard to different qualities available at different prices and taking horizontal differentiation
fixed. Instead here breadth is understood as appealing to a broader horizontal range. More substantively
the model is intended to reflect the sale of a single service (for example the time of a lawyer) where the
quantity sold can be understood as probability of sale and is sold at a fixed price (the hourly fee). Thus
the model and focus here is quite different from the multi-product case.
3Chatain and Zemsky (2007) have a similar motivation in highlighting that strategic as well as productive
considerations determine the choice to be broad or specialized. The mechanisms and methods are somewhat
different inasmuch as they model the post-location game as cooperative and, more substantively, in that
they model “breadth” as a central location on a Hotelling line with demand located at the end points.
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Figure 1: Agents are located at either end of a Hotelling line and choose between broad
(blue/solid) and deep (red/dashed) strategies.
close to customers can lead profits to be non-monotonic in transport costs.
Other literature, in particular various interesting works by Garicano and Hubbard
(2003, 2006), has examined the extent of specialization in legal markets and focussed
primarily on determining how technology and market structure affect the extent of firm
specialization and firm organization, but does not allow for non-monotonic effects.
1 Model
Two agents are located at either end of a Hotelling line of length 1. At the first stage of
the game, they simultaneously choose either a broad/general strategy, or a deep/specialized
strategy. For L, the agent on the left of the line, this is a choice (qL, YL) ∈ {(0, [0, α]), (1, {0})}
where the first component qL denotes the vertical quality and the second component YL
the horizontal range. We restrict α ∈ (0, 12). Similarly the right agent R chooses between
(0, [1− α, 1]) and (1, {1}).
After observing each other’s strategies, the rivals compete in prices pL and pR.
A consumer of type (x, θ) when purchasing from an agent with strategy (qi, Yi) at a
price pi obtains utility
U(Yi, qi, pi|x, θ) = U + θqi − pi − t(Yi, x) (1)
where t(Yi, x) = t ∗ inf{(y − x)2 s.t. y ∈ Yi}. Consumers are uniformly distributed on a
unit square: x ∼ U [0, 1] and, independently, θ ∼ U [1, 2].
Note the timing in the model: The choice of depth or breadth takes place before trade
and the agents compete by setting a single price The model is intended to reflect, for
example, lawyers’ choices of whether to study or train in a broad field, or focus their
studies in a particular speciality and then competing in setting hourly rates.
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2 Equilibrium
Even in this simple game, a full characterization for all parameters is not trivial as there are
different constraints that may bind. In particular, an agent when choosing its price might
anticipate that marginal customers are indifferent between buying his good and his rival’s
or between buying its good and not buying. Indeed there may be marginal customers of
both types simultaneously. I characterize both extremes, first supposing that agents are
local monopolists and next that all consumers are served.
2.1 Local monopolists
First suppose that the left agent is deep and a local monopolist so that indifferent consumers
are such that U + θ − pL − tx
2 = 0. Then profits are given by4
pL
∫ 2
1
∫ (U+θ−pL
t
)
1
2
0
dxdθ (2)
Attempting to take the first order condition with respect to pL and solving gives an
analytically awkward expression; however, it is clear that if the monopolist is to make sales,
it must be the case that pL ≤ U +2 and that its volume of sales would be no higher than if
it were to charge a price of 0. It follows that one can construct an upper bound on profits
that is decreasing in t and, in particular, that profits are arbitrarily small as t −→∞.
Next suppose that the left agent is broad and a local monopolist. The agent can always
a charge a price just under U and sell to the fraction α of consumers who incur no travel
costs, so that its profits are always bounded below by αU irrespective of transport costs.
It is clear, therefore, that as transport costs rise and competition is softened, eventually
both agents will prefer to choose broad strategies.
2.2 Full market coverage
If t is low enough and U is sufficiently high, all consumers buy and marginal consumers are
defined by indifference between the two agents. There are three cases to consider, where
both agents are deep, both are broad, or there is one of each type.
2.2.1 Both deep
Suppose that both agents are deep. A consumer (x, θ) is indifferent between the two when
U + θ − tx2 − pL = U + θ − t(1− x)
2 − pR. (3)
4Note that in writing this down implicitly I assume that U + θ− pL− tx
2|θ=1,x=0 ≥ 0, equivalently that
U ≥ pL and that (
U+θ−pL
t
)
1
2 |θ=2 ≤
1
2
or U + 2 − pL ≤
t
2
. It can be shown that the firm’s optimal pL is
non-increasing in t and for t large enough this must be true.
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Solving for indifferent consumers x = 12t (t− pL + pR) allows us to write down the
left agent’s profit 12tpL (t− pL + pR). The agent’s maximization problem defines a best
response function or optimal price as a function of the rival’s price pL(pR) =
t+pR
2 . Solving
the analogous problem for the right agent and finding the equilibrium at the intersection
of the best response functions, one obtains that pL = pR = t and both agents earn profits
of t2 .
2.2.2 Both broad
A consumer (x, θ) is indifferent between the two when
U − t(x− α)2 − pL = U − t(1− α− x)
2 − pR (4)
Again, by solving for the indifferent consumer x = 12t−4tα (t− pL + pR − 2tα) and tak-
ing first order condition for profit maximization one obtains pL(pR) =
1
2 t+
1
2pR − tα. One
can then solve for pL = pR = t(1− 2α). Profits here are
t(1−2α)
2 .
2.2.3 One broad, one deep
Suppose that the left agent is deep and the right agent is broad. Indifferent consumers are
such that:
U + θ − tx2 − pL = U − t(1− α− x)
2 − pR. (5)
Indifferent consumers can therefore be defined by x(θ) = θ−pL+pR+t(1−α)
2
2t(1−α) so long as
this is interior. Suppose that x(1) and x(2) are both interior (it is easy to verify that there
are parameters under which this is the case and which are consistent with local monopoly
for sufficiently high t). Then x(θ) is interior for all θ and we can write L’s profits as
pL
∫ 2
1
∫ θ−pL+pR+t(1−α)2
2t(1−α)
0 dxdθ and R
′s profits as pR
∫ 2
1
∫ 1− θ−pL+pR+t(1−α)2
2t(1−α)
0 dxdθ.
By taking first order conditions and solving for optimal prices, one can obtain that the
maximized profits here are ΠDBL =
(2tα2−8tα+6t+3)2
72t(1−α) and Π
DB
R =
(2tα2+4tα−6t+3)2
72t(1−α) .
There will be an equilibrium where one agent chooses to be broad and the other agent
chooses to be deep if ΠDBL >
t(1−α)
2 (so the left agent prefers to be deep than broad)
and ΠDBR >
t
2 (so that the right agent prefers to be broad than deep). For example with
α = 0.2, this requires that t < 0.286.
Note that when t is sufficiently small, efficiency would instead require that both agents
should choose to be deep.
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3 Conclusions
The analysis above suggests that for sufficiently low transport costs, equilibrium will involve
one broad and one deep agent. As transport costs increase, the equilibrium sees both rivals
deep. As transport costs continue to increase, eventually both agents would choose to
be broad local monopolists. Thus the extent of specialization can be non-monotonic in
transport costs.
There are a number of extensions and further considerations that one could easily
imagine. First, one might wish for a full characterization at all parameter values, alternative
specifications for transport costs, and more general distributions of consumers. Second, a
more natural interpretation of increasing competition is reducing a cost of entering the
industry and allowing agents to locate on a Salop circle, as in Salop (1979). Indeed, the
interpretation of a fall in the transport cost as an increase in competition informally appeals
to the notion of increased entry and “closer” firms with a fall in entry costs, though a full
characterization of entry in a Salop circle model is complicated inasmuch as equidistant
positioning is not a natural assumption with asymmetric firms.5 Finally, one might consider
agents choosing at some cost to extend their breadth (as Alexandrov (2006) allows for
in a purely horizontal model) and to choose their depth at some cost, as is typical in
vertical models. These are not trivial extensions and in general spatial models can provide
technical challenges; however, one may readily anticipate, that similar considerations to
those outlined in this note might arise. In particular, as a specific example, should the
cost of entry into the legal profession fall, the analysis suggests that there could be either
a greater or smaller proportion of specialized lawyers as a result. In principle one could
test for such non-monotonic effects.
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